The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Situation in Afghanistan by Ochs, Sara L
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection 
Volume 95 Issue 2 Article 1 
12-2019 
The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the 
Situation in Afghanistan 
Sara L. Ochs 
Elon University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr_online 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Notre Dame L. Rev. Reflection 89 (2019). 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review Reflection by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For 
more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu. 
 89 
THE UNITED STATES, THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, AND THE SITUATION IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
Sara L. Ochs* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has always had a very complicated and tense relationship 
with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and with international criminal law 
generally.
1
  Yet, under the Trump administration, the U.S.–ICC relationship has 
deteriorated to an unprecedented level.  Within the last few years, the U.S. 
government has launched a full-scale attack on the ICC—denouncing its legitimacy, 
authority, and achievements, blocking investigations, and loudly withdrawing all 
once-existing support for the court. 
These hostilities bubbled over following the November 2017 request by the 
ICC Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, for the court to open an investigation into 
alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan since 
2003, including those perpetrated by the U.S. military.
2
  The U.S. government has 
always viewed the ICC as an entity designed to infringe on state sovereignty, and 
Prosecutor Bensouda’s request immediately invited harsh retaliation from the 
Trump administration.  The United States, largely through and at the direction of 
President Trump’s former National Security Advisor, John Bolton, took significant 
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 * Sara L. Ochs is a fellow at Elon University School of Law, where she teaches International 
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 1 See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & Mark A. Drumbl, The United States and the 
International Criminal Court: A Complicated, Uneasy, Yet at Times Engaging Relationship 2–8 
(Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-07-02, 2016), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1504&context=wlufac 
(tracing the history of U.S. involvement in and relationship with the ICC under the Clinton, Bush, 
and Obama administrations). 
 2 See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, Fatou Bensouda, Requests Judicial Authorisation to Commence an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=171120-otp-stat-afgh [hereinafter Press Release on Bensouda’s 
Request for Investigation]. 
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efforts to block all preliminary investigations into the Afghanistan situation, going 
so far as to revoke Prosecutor Bensouda’s visa to enter the United States and 
threatening economic sanctions if the ICC continued its investigation.
3
 
Following the U.S. government’s prolonged and very public attack, an ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber rejected Prosecutor Bensouda’s request, citing the volatility 
surrounding the proposed investigation and the minimal cooperation the Office of 
the Prosecutor had encountered to date.
4
  The court’s language leaves little doubt 
that the U.S. attack on the ICC and its personnel served as the crux of its decision. 
The United States’s hostilities come at a time when the ICC is subject to severe 
global scrutiny.  Widespread allegations that the court is unfairly targeting African 
states and seeking to undermine the sovereignty of its state members has created a 
“legitimacy crisis” in the court, prompting the withdrawal of several African and 
Asian states from the Rome Statute.
5
  In efforts to counter the global perception that 
the ICC cares only about African crimes, in 2016, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) reiterated a policy of investigating a broad array of crimes committed in 
geographically diverse locations.
6
  In line with this policy, the OTP has begun 
pursuing preliminary examinations into crimes committed in non-African states, 
several of which implicate Western powers, including permanent members of the 
U.N. Security Council.
7
  While these investigations have elicited further backlash 
against the ICC—primarily by Western states—none has sparked as antagonistic and 
detrimental a response as the proposed investigation into Afghanistan.  
The ICC’s apparent bending of will to the hostile attacks from the United States 
presents legitimate concern regarding the future direction of the court, as well as that 
of international criminal law more broadly.  Likewise, in many ways, the ICC’s 
decision significantly undermines U.S. foreign policy initiatives and prerogatives.  
 
 3 Judith Kelley, The U.S. Revoked the Visa for the ICC Prosecutor. That Bodes Poorly for 
International Criminal Justice., WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/08/us-revoked-visa-icc-prosecutor-that-bodes-
poorly-international-criminal-justice/?utm_term=.c04ad3fd666c. 
 4 See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17, Decision Pursuant 
to Art. 15 of the Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 94 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF [hereafter Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation]. 
 5 To date, Burundi, the Philippines, and Malaysia have withdrawn from the Rome Statute.  
Malaysia Backtracks on Accession to the Rome Statute, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 12, 
2019), http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20190412/malaysia-backtracks-accession-rome-
statute; Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 
15, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/qa-international-criminal-court-and-united-
states. 
 6 See generally OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM. CT., POLICY PAPER ON CASE 
SELECTION AND PRIORITISATION ¶ 7, at 4–5 (2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf. 
 7 See Carsten Stahn, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Challenges and Critiques 
of Preliminary Examinations at the ICC, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 413, 415–16 (2017) (discussing 
the ICC’s opening of preliminary examinations into unlawful killings committed by British troops 
in Iraq, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed within the Israel-Palestine conflict, and 
crimes—including those allegedly committed by Russia—in the conflicts within Ukraine and 
Crimea). 
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This Essay will examine the complicated history of the U.S.–ICC relationship, as 
well as the background of and reasons for the court’s decision denying Prosecutor 
Bensouda’s request for an investigation into Afghanistan.  The Essay will conclude 
by examining the significant and detrimental impact this decision may ultimately 
have on both the ICC and U.S. foreign policy. 
I.     A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ICC 
The United States bears a convoluted history with the ICC.  While the United 
States played a significant role in the Rome Conference, it quickly became one of 
the most outspoken opponents of the ICC and ultimately voted against the adoption 
of the Rome Statute.
8
  Notably, the U.S. delegation in Rome identified three primary 
concerns with the statute: (1) it provided the court with the ability to exercise 
jurisdiction over non-States Parties; (2) it enabled the Prosecutor to initiate 
investigations and prosecutions on his or her own authority; and (3) it did not require 
Security Council authorization before bringing a case of aggression before the 
court.
9
 
Despite these concerns, a growing domestic opposition to ICC jurisdiction, and 
a conflicted presidential cabinet, on December 31, 2000, shortly before the 
conclusion of his term and on the last day the Rome Statute was open for signature, 
then President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute.
1 0
  Yet, in his signing statement, 
President Clinton recognized the court’s “significant flaws,” notably the first 
objection raised by the U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference.
1 1
  He further 
announced his recommendation that President George W. Bush, as his successor, 
not immediately submit the Rome Statute to the Senate for ratification.
1 2
 
Under the subsequent Bush administration, tensions between the United States 
and the ICC heightened significantly.  In August 2002, Congress enacted the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which aimed to shield members of the 
U.S. armed forces from international prosecution by the ICC and even authorized 
the U.S. President to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to obtain the release 
of American soldiers from ICC detention.
1 3
  The United States also negotiated—
largely through political intimidation—approximately one hundred bilateral 
 
 8 See Stephen Eliot Smith, Definitely Maybe: The Outlook for U.S. Relations with the 
International Criminal Court During the Obama Administration, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 155, 160 
(2010). 
 9 Sadat & Drumbl, supra note 1, at 4.  In total, the delegation recognized six objections to 
the Rome Statute, the remaining being (1) that the statute did not include a ten-year opt-out period 
for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a resolution appended to the statute proposing that drug crimes and 
terrorism be included within the court’s jurisdiction; and (3) that the statute did not allow for states 
to make any reservations prior to signing.  Id. at 4, n.14. 
 10 See John P. Cerone, Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes Toward 
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 277, 293 (2007). 
 11 Press Release, White House, Statement by the President: Signature of the International 
Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31, 2000), 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/library/hot_releases/December_31_2000.html. 
 12 Smith, supra note 8, at 161. 
 13 See id. at 162 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7427(a) (2012)). 
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“nonsurrender” agreements, under which States Parties agreed not to surrender any 
American citizen sought by the ICC who entered their state territory.
1 4
  Finally, and 
most importantly, in a letter sent by John Bolton, then U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations and later the National Security Advisor under President Trump, the 
Bush administration notified the United Nations that it had “unsigned” the Rome 
Statute,
1 5
 which Bolton has famously cited as “his happiest moment.”1 6  
The United States’s animosity towards the ICC melted slightly under the 
Obama administration, which sought to “end hostility towards the ICC and look for 
opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that promote U.S. interests 
by bringing war criminals to justice.”1 7   President Obama even voted for the U.N. 
Security Council resolution that referred to the ICC the situation in Libya involving 
the brutal violence against protestors of the Muammar Gadaffi regime, and 
remarkably lobbied other Council States to do the same.
1 8
  Yet, despite these 
improvements in the United States’s relationship with the ICC, the Obama 
administration still refused to submit the Rome Statute, which it viewed as “flawed,” 
to the U.S. Senate for a vote on ratification.
1 9
  As one commentator recognized, 
while the Obama administration discontinued the expression of open hostilities 
towards the court, it did not “abandon the conservative policies that distance and 
protect America from the ICC.”2 0  
The U.S. government’s hesitation toward and apparent distrust of the ICC 
essentially boils down to one primary concern: the possibility that U.S. citizens may 
be prosecuted and convicted by the court for conduct ordered or supported by the 
U.S. government.
2 1
  And this concern is not unfounded.  The United States has an 
 
 14  See Cerone, supra note 10, at 296; see also Eric M. Meyer, International Law: The 
Compatibility of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court with the U.S. Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements Included in the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 58 OKLA. L. 
REV. 97, 99 (2005) (recognizing that the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act contained a 
provision prohibiting the U.S. from providing military assistance to any ICC State Party unless the 
State Party has signed a bilateral nonsurrender agreement or is subject to a relevant exception). 
 15 See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., to 
Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec’y Gen. (May 6, 2002), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm. 
 16 John B. Bellinger III, International Law and the Foreign Affairs Challenges for the Next 
Administration, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 909, 913 (2017). 
 17 Jean Galbraith, Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the International 
Criminal Court, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 169, 169 (2019) (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, International 
Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 525, 534 (2013) (quoting Secretary of State Hilary 
Clinton)). 
 18 Megan A. Fairlie, The United States and the International Criminal Court Post Bush: A 
Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely Marriage, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 528, 529 (2011) (noting 
further that the Obama administration sent representatives to the ICC’s annual meeting of the 
Assembly of States Parties in 2009 and sent a number of Americans to attend and observe the ICC 
Review Conference in Uganda in mid-2010). 
 19 See Bellinger, supra note 16, at 913–14. 
 20 See Brett D. Schaefer, Beating the ICC, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 18, 2013), 
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/beating-the-icc. 
 21 See Steven Veenema, Willful Ignorance—Contextualizing U.S. Policy Toward the 
International Criminal Court, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 167, 181–83 (2006) (noting as 
2019] T H E  U . S . ,  T H E  I C C ,  A N D  T H E  S I T U A T I O N  I N  A F G H A N I S T A N  93 
 
unfortunate history of engaging in internationally prohibited conduct in times of 
armed conflict, including its widespread use of chemical weapons in Vietnam and 
the abuse and torture of prisoners of war at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.
2 2
 
Thus, when the ICC began intimating its intent to investigate U.S. involvement 
in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan, the 
Trump administration found serious cause for concern and ultimately reignited the 
American fight against the ICC.  Unfortunately, this fight has proven detrimental to 
both sides. 
II.     THE REQUEST TO OPEN AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE AFGHANISTAN 
SITUATION 
Afghanistan has experienced several civil wars and decades of internal unrest 
since the 1970s, culminating in the U.S. invasion and subsequent international 
conflict following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
2 3
  In 2006, the ICC OTP 
initially opened a preliminary examination into alleged crimes committed in 
Afghanistan
2 4
  Little documented progress was made within the preliminary 
examination until November 2017, when Prosecutor Bensouda sought to proceed 
with an investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed in Afghanistan since May 1, 2003, as well as closely linked crimes 
committed in other States Parties’ territories since July 1, 2002.2 5   Because 
Prosecutor Bensouda intended to initiate the investigation proprio motu, or on her 
own authority, she requested judicial approval from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber to 
open the investigation, as required by Article 15 of the Rome Statute.
2 6
  The request 
specifically proposed investigation into three categories of crimes: (1) crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed by the Taliban and related armed groups (i.e., 
the Haqqani Network); (2) war crimes committed by the Afghan National Security 
Forces; and (3) war crimes committed by members of the U.S. armed forces in 
Afghanistan, as well as by the CIA in secret detention facilities within Afghanistan 
and on the territory of other States Parties.
2 7  
 
well that the U.S. fear that an ICC Prosecutor could question U.S. judicial action and determine 
“that any U.S. prosecution or investigation constituted a failure to genuinely prosecute”). 
 22 See generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005) (detailing 
and questioning the international legality of the prisoner abuses at Guantanamo Bay and Abu 
Ghraib). 
 23 See Afghanistan, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/afghanistan (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
 24 See Press Release on Bensouda’s Request for Investigation, supra note 2. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 15, ¶¶ 1, 3, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (requiring that the 
Prosecutor “submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, 
together with any supporting material collected,” and permitting the opening of the investigation 
only upon the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization of same, “without prejudice to subsequent 
determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of the case”) . 
 27 Press Release on Bensouda’s Request for Investigation, supra note 2. 
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Prosecutor Bensouda’s request embodied two of the primary objections the 
United States has consistently maintained against the ICC since the Rome 
Conference: the power of the court to exercise jurisdiction over nonstates parties 
(including the United States), and the power of the prosecutor to initiate 
investigations on her own authority.
2 8
  In response to Prosecutor Bensouda’s 
request, on September 10, 2018, John Bolton delivered an address attacking the ICC 
and its decision to continue investigations into the U.S. military’s role in 
Afghanistan.
2 9
  Bolton labeled the court as a threat to American sovereignty and 
national security interests and promised that the United States would take “any 
means necessary” to protect its citizens and citizens of allied nations “from unjust 
prosecution by this illegitimate court.”3 0   He also vowed not to provide the ICC with 
any further American cooperation or assistance, deciding instead to “let the ICC die 
on its own.”3 1   While Bolton’s attack was met largely with international 
condemnation,
3 2
 it still posed a sizable threat to the court’s legitimacy. 
The ICC succinctly addressed Bolton’s virulent speech by recognizing that it 
would be “undeterred” in its mission to bring justice to communities affected by 
perpetrators of international crimes.
3 3
  Yet, in March 2019, Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo announced that the United States would revoke or deny visas to ICC 
personnel coming to the United States for purposes related to the investigation into 
the situation in Afghanistan.
3 4
  In April 2019, the United States revoked the entry 
visa for Prosecutor Bensouda and, through Pompeo, threatened to take additional 
steps, including economic sanctions, if the ICC continued its investigation.
3 5
 
On April 12, 2019, these escalating pressures culminated in a unanimous 
decision by the three judges on ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC) rejecting Prosecutor 
Bensouda’s request to proceed with the investigation.3 6   In its decision, the PTC first 
recognized that the intent of Article 15 of the Rome Statute in requiring judicial 
 
 28 Veenema, supra note 21, at 181. 
 29 Galbraith, supra note 17, at 169. 
 30 Matthew Lee, Bolton: International Criminal Court ‘Already Dead to Us’, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 11, 2018); https://www.apnews.com/4831767ed5db484ead574a402a5e7a85. 
 31 Galbraith, supra note 17, at 170. 
 32 See Alex Moorehead & Alex Whiting, Countries’ Reactions to Bolton’s Attack on the ICC, 
JUST SECURITY (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60773/countries-reactions-boltons-
attack-icc/; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law: A 
Reply, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 16, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/16/the-trump-administration-
and-international-law-a-reply/ (noting that the only states to offer support to Bolton’s speech were 
those with officials under investigation by the ICC, including Sudan and Burundi). 
 33 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The ICC Will Continue Its Independent and Impartial 
Work, Undeterred, ICC-CPI-20180912-PR1406 (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1406. 
 34 Marlise Simons & Megan Specia, U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C. Prosecutor Pursuing Afghan 
War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/world/europe/us-
icc-prosecutor-afghanistan.html (referencing Pompeo’s comments made in a March 2019 press 
briefing directed to ICC investigators and personnel stating they “should not assume that you will 
still have or will get a visa, or that you will be permitted to enter the United States”). 
 35 Kelley, supra note 3. 
 36 See generally Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation, supra note 4. 
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authorization for a propio motu investigation is partly to prevent “[f]rivolous, 
ungrounded or otherwise predictably inconclusive investigations [that] would 
unnecessarily infringe on fundamental individual rights without serving either the 
interests of justice or any of the universal values underlying the Statute.”3 7   It then 
cited the standard imposed by Article 15, requiring that the Prosecutor present a 
“reasonable basis to proceed with [the] investigation.”3 8   In determining whether the 
Prosecutor has done so, the PTC recognized that it must consider: (1) whether the 
crime falls within the jurisdiction of the court; (2) whether the case is admissible 
(with regard to the requisite gravity of the alleged crimes and the Rome Statute’s 
complementarity requirement); and (3) whether there are “nonetheless substantial 
reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”3 9   
The PTC then determined that in considering the third factor, requiring that the 
investigation be “in the interests of justice,” it needed to weigh the gravity of the 
alleged crimes, the victims’ interests, and the potential feasibility of the 
investigation.
4 0
 
After positively finding that Prosecutor Bensouda’s proposed investigation 
met the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements of the Rome Statute,
4 1
 the PTC 
then ultimately determined that the investigation, which had already been met by 
“severe constraints and challenges,”4 2  would not serve the “interests of justice.”4 3   
In so doing, the PTC noted the minimal cooperation the OTP had experienced from 
authorities in investigating the crimes, the “complexity and volatility of the political 
climate still surrounding the Afghan scenario,” and the significant time that has 
elapsed since the alleged commission of the crimes.
4 4
  Despite recognizing that 680 
out of 699 applications submitted to the court by victims and victims groups 
welcomed the requested investigation,
4 5
 the PTC concluded that the aforementioned 
circumstances made prospects of a successful investigation unlikely and that the 
investigation thus ran afoul of the interests of justice.
4 6
 
 
 37 Id. ¶ 34. 
 38 Id. ¶ 29. 
 39 Id. ¶ 87.  The PTC noted these factors are set forth in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, which 
governs the standard appropriate for a Prosecutor to determine whether there is a “reasonable basis 
to proceed with an investigation.”  See id. ¶ 29; see also Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 53(1). 
 40 Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation, supra note 4, ¶ 35. 
 41
 
See id. ¶¶ 48, 66 (finding that the alleged crimes fell within the Rome Statute); ¶¶ 79, 86 
(finding the admissibility requirement satisfied both with regard to complementarity and the gravity 
of the alleged crimes). 
 42 Id. ¶ 44. 
 43 Id. ¶ 87. 
 44 Id. ¶¶ 93–94. 
 45
 
Id. ¶ 87.  Article 15 of the Rome Statute explicitly provides that victims may make 
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber either in support or opposition to the Prosecutor’s request 
for an investigation.  Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 15(3). 
 46 Pre-Trial Decision on Authorisation, supra note 4, ¶ 96. 
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III.     THE IMPACT OF THE PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER’S DECISION  
Prosecutor Bensouda’s request to open an investigation into the situation in 
Afghanistan embodied the primary concerns voiced by the United States since the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute.  It presented a concrete possibility of investigation 
and prosecution of not only U.S. citizens, but of high-ranking military and state 
officials.  Viewed through this lens, the Trump administration’s backlash to 
Prosecutor Bensouda’s request is far from surprising.  Yet, the ICC’s response to 
U.S. hostilities in denying the investigation request has potentially drastic 
implications both for the court’s legitimacy and for U.S. foreign policy. 
The PTC’s decision does little to assuage criticism of the court’s exclusive 
focus on prosecuting African crimes.  In fact, by rewarding the United States for its 
failure to cooperate, the PTC sends the message that Western powers are immune 
from international prosecution for war crimes, especially when they act to pose 
obstacles to OTP investigations.  The PTC’s decision is a clear example of the ICC 
succumbing to American pressures and sweeping heinous crimes under the rug in 
an effort to ensure goodwill with members of the U.N. Security Council.  
Specifically, this sets dangerous precedent undermining the OTP’s recent efforts to 
expand its geographic reach.  This is especially concerning given the open 
preliminary examination into alleged war crimes committed by UK nationals in the 
context of the Iraq conflict between 2003 and 2008.
4 7
  Like the Afghanistan 
situation, any investigation opened within the Iraq–UK situation would most likely 
be through Prosecutor Bensouda’s propio motu authority.4 8   The PTC’s decision 
logically encourages UK officials to refuse cooperation to the greatest extent 
possible in an effort to render infeasible any potential investigation into British war 
crimes. 
While the PTC’s decision has been met largely with outrage,4 9  one group of 
scholars has applauded the PTC’s decision on the ground that it marks a policy shift 
towards devoting the court’s minimal resources only to those investigations that 
 
 47 See Preliminary Examination: Iraq/UK, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/iraq 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2019). 
 48 See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, Re-Opens the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Iraq (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014 (noting that while 
the preliminary examination was concluded in 2006, Prosecutor Bensouda reopened the 
preliminary examination in May 2014, following receipt of new information supporting allegations 
that British officials were involved in “systematic detainee abuse in Iraq from 2003 until 2008”). 
 49 See, e.g., Afghanistan: ICC Refuses to Authorize Investigation, Caving into USA Threats, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/afghanistan-
icc-refuses-to-authorize-investigation-caving-into-usa-threats/ (opining that the decision “marks a 
shocking abandonment of victims and will further weaken the court’s credibility”); Christian De 
Vos, No ICC Investigation in Afghanistan: A Bad Decision with Big Implications, INT’L JUSTICE 
MONITOR (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/04/no-icc-investigation-in-
afghanistan-a-bad-decision-with-big-implications/ (noting that the decision “surprised and angered 
many”). 
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yield a strong likelihood of success.
5 0
  This view further promotes an ICC focused 
only on crimes that do not implicate states with close ties to the United Nations, 
further alienating the developing Asian and African states who already feel 
victimized by the court.  Moreover, there is no evidence that this decision marks any 
new policy towards focusing exclusively on investigations and prosecutions in 
which the states or parties involved are highly cooperative.  Indeed, the court 
continues to pursue a case pertaining to crimes committed in the government of the 
Philippines’ “war on drugs” campaign, even though the Philippines objected so 
strongly to the ICC’s opening of a preliminary examination that it withdrew from 
the Rome Statute.
5 1
  Thus, marking the PTC decision as representative of a policy 
shift in favor of efficiency is unrealistically optimistic.  
Further, while the Trump administration has labeled the PTC’s decision a 
“major international victory,”5 2  the United States’s apparent disdain for the ICC 
significantly compromises the nation’s status as a proponent of global justice.  The 
Trump administration’s conduct in rebuking the authority and the legitimacy of the 
only permanent court established to prosecute crimes committed at an international 
level undermines U.S. policy in bringing perpetrators of worldwide atrocities to 
justice.
5 3
  By calling for the death of the ICC, the Trump administration has 
concretized the United States’s reputation as an international bully and has sought 
to eradicate an institution that oftentimes provides the sole means for bringing brutal 
dictators and atrocity perpetrators to justice. 
The Trump administration’s actions also undermine U.S. foreign policy 
initiatives.  By taking a very public, very loud offensive to the ICC’s Afghanistan 
decision, the United States has welcomed impunity for atrocities committed by the 
Taliban and affiliated groups deemed as terrorist organizations by the U.S. 
Department of State.
5 4
  The United States’s constant pressure on the ICC resulted 
in the PTC’s decision to block Prosecutor Bensouda’s requested investigation in its 
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entirety, meaning that the OTP lacks judicial authorization to investigate any of the 
three categories of crimes listed in Prosecutor Bensouda’s request, including those 
committed by the Taliban.  This is especially concerning, not only because of the 
gravity of the Taliban’s atrocity crimes, but also because—unlike the alleged crimes 
committed by Afghan forces and the U.S. military—the OTP had obtained 
meaningful cooperation from both international and domestic organizations in 
Afghanistan and had compiled significant evidence connecting the Taliban to these 
alleged crimes.
5 5
  The Trump administration’s rash and selfish attack on the ICC 
has effectively prevented one of the world’s most feared and despised terrorist 
organizations from facing repercussion for some of its most heinous crimes. 
More broadly, the Trump administration’s hostilities against the ICC 
undermine U.S. foreign policy initiatives advocating for the international 
prosecution of atrocities perpetrated abroad.  For instance, the Trump administration 
has maintained a policy of bringing to justice those responsible for the persecution 
of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar,
5 6
 which the U.N. has labeled a “textbook 
example of ethnic cleansing.”5 7   While the Trump administration has noted “serious 
concerns” regarding the capability of Myanmar’s domestic judicial system to 
adequately prosecute those crimes, it has also failed to provide a valid option for a 
judicial mechanism that would be capable of rendering appropriate justice.
5 8
  The 
United States’s refusal to acknowledge the potential of the ICC, which has 
recognized jurisdiction over certain aspects of the Rohingya situation and currently 
appears to be the only criminal law mechanism capable of achieving justice for the 
Rohingya,
5 9
 not only portrays the current administration as illogical and 
uncooperative, but more importantly disadvantages the victims of these crimes.  If 
the current administration is—as it claims—striving to achieve justice for the 
Rohingya and similarly situated victims of internationally recognized crimes, its 
failure to cooperate and support the ICC essentially renders this goal unattainable. 
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Finally, the Trump administration’s attack on the ICC and the subsequent PTC 
decision is most detrimental to the victims of the heinous crimes committed in 
Afghanistan.  A 2017 report issued by the Office of the Prosecutor on the 
investigation into Afghanistan included tentative estimations that the Taliban and its 
affiliated groups were responsible for 17,000 civilian deaths, 7000 of which were 
the result of deliberate and targeted civilian attacks, including attacks on schools, 
shrines, mosques, and humanitarian organizations’ offices.6 0   The ICC’s decision to 
close the investigation at the bullying hands of the Trump administration rewards 
the perpetrators of these crimes with temporary, and possibly complete, impunity.  
Again, not only does this impunity contribute to issues of instability within the 
Afghani government and society, but it further undermines U.S. policy to bring to 
justice those Taliban leaders responsible for these mass atrocities, many of whom 
also targeted U.S. military personnel. 
CONCLUSION 
In June 2019, Prosecutor Bensouda filed a request seeking clearance to appeal 
the PTC’s decision denying the investigation.6 1   Likewise, legal representatives for 
eighty-two victims of all three categories of crimes listed in the investigation request 
have lodged their appeal of the PTC decision with the ICC Appeals Chamber with 
oral arguments conducted in December 2019.
6 2
  In addition, several former U.N. 
Special Rapporteurs, international experts, and international organizations, 
including Amnesty International and Human Right Watch, among others, have filed 
requests to submit amicus curiae observations with the ICC, arguing that the Pre-
Trial Chamber erred in finding that opening the investigation into Afghanistan 
would not serve the interests of justice.
6 3  
It is also important to note that the PTC decision does not completely close the 
preliminary examination into the situation in Afghanistan.  Indeed, Article 15 
provides that a denial of authorization “shall not preclude the presentation of a 
subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the 
same situation.”6 4   Yet, even considering the acquisition of new evidence supporting 
the commission of grave crimes in Afghanistan, given the PTC’s “interests of 
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justice” reasoning, it is difficult to see how any proposed investigation could obtain 
the necessary authorization to move forward. 
The full extent of the effects of the current U.S. administration’s approach to 
the ICC, especially with regard to its investigation into Afghanistan, remain yet to 
be seen.  However, its efforts to paint the ICC as an illegitimate, ineffective 
institution may serve to compromise U.S. national security efforts and foreign policy 
initiatives.  As far as the ICC, substantial speculation remains whether the court will 
recover swiftly from the backlash of the PTC decision, or whether, as John Bolton 
has predicted, it will “die on its own.”6 5  
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